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I. IRODUCTION
The 1998 baseball season was a season for the ages-Mark McGwire and
Sammy Sosa staged a furious and exhilarating race to break Roger Maris's
record for the most home runs in a single season;1 the New York Yankees,
arguably the greatest team in the history of baseball, won the World Series;2
Roger Clemens received a record fifth Cy Young award;3 and Nolan Ryan,
George Brett, and Robin Yount all were inducted into the Hall of Fame on their
first time on the ballot.4 It seemed that in 1998, every golden moment in
baseball-and the joy it brought to baseball fans-was highlighted and
documented in grandiose fashion by new~spapers, magazines, and televisions
around the world. The 1998 baseball season reminded Americans and the rest of
the world that baseball truly is "America's game," and the enthusiasm of the
1998 season carried into 1999 season. As with the 1998 season, hallowed records
were threatened as players like Manny Ramirez, Wade Boggs, Tony Gwynn,
Sammy Sosa, and Mark McGwire-again--chased the ghosts of legends past.5
I See Frank Deford, The Power and the Glory in Their Dignified Duel: Two-Time
Sportsmen Used the Summer of '98 to Exalt the Home Run, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Oct. 7,
1998, at 20, 20.
2 See Tom Verducci, Mowing Them Down with Awesome Efficiency, These Yankees
Flattened the Competition and Raised This Question: Are They the Best Ever?, SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED, Oct. 28, 1998, at 30, 30.
3 See Mel Atonen, Clemens: 5 Cy Youngs, Blue Jay Unanimous Choice, USA TODAY,
Nov. 17, 1998, at 4C.
4 See Tony Massasrotti, Ryan Takes Express; Sweeps to Cooperstown on First Try with
Brett, Yount, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 6, 1999, at F2.
5 There were several hallowed baseball records in jeopardy of being broken in this
year's baseball season. Manny Ramirez of the Cleveland Indians was threatening seriously
to break Hack Wilson's record for the most runs batted in during one season before a mid-
season injury cut short his efforts. See Jack Curry, In the Season of Silence, Manny Speaks,
PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), July 22, 1999,'at 6-D. Tony Gwynn and Wade Boggs both joined
the elite 3000-hit club. See Single-Minded as They Closed in on Hit Number 3000, SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED, Oct. 28, 1998, at 44, 44. Sammy Sosa and Mark McGwire again engaged in
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Baseball's resurgent popularity is remarkable, given the fact that just four years
ago, fans had all but forsaken baseball. Fans were simply sick and tired of the
constant labor battles between the owners and the players. 6
As the end of the current collective bargaining agreement approaches, the
possibility of another labor war between the owners and the players threatens
baseball's resurrection. In the past, many commentators have clamored for the
lifting of baseball's antitrust exemption, a legacy unique to American
professional sports, as a possible panacea for all of baseball's labor. Finally, in
November of 1998, Congress-with surprisingly little fanfare-replied in kind
by passing the Curt Flood Act7 to lift baseball's antitrust exemption.8
What impact will this "landmark" Act by Congress have upon the way
players and owners negotiate and resolve their grievances with one another? Is
the lifting of baseball's antitrust exemption status the answer to baseball's history
of volatile collective bargaining negotiations, or will the impact of the Curt Flood
Act of 1998 be as silent as its passage through Congress?
This Note will discuss the evolution of collective bargaining in baseball, its
current state of antagonism, and the impact that the Curt Flood Act will have
upon the negotiation processes. Part I gives a general overview of antitrust and
labor law as well as on the ways in which the collective bargaining process has
evolved from the conflict between these strains of law. Parts II, IlI, and IV
discuss the development of professional baseball's antitrust exemption by the
courts and the effect it has had upon labor relations. Part V discusses how
collective bargaining negotiations have developed into a hostile process between
the players and the owners as a direct result of baseball's antitrust exemption,
and it offers possible solutions to alleviate the hostility. Finally, Part VI discusses
the Curt Flood Act of 1998, its implications for baseball's antitrust exemption,
and the effect, if any, that it will have upon baseball's collective bargaining
process.
a two-man race for the home run title and in the process became the only tandem of hitters
ever to hit 60 home runs in a season. See Dan le Batard & Tim Keown, Jack 4 Back, ESPN
MAG., Aug. 23, 1999, at 54, 54.
6 See Edward Mathias, Squeeze Play: Will Baseball's Economic Problems Cause More
Legal Headaches for the National Pastime?, 5 SPORTS LAW. J. 249, 259 (1998) (citing PAUL
KAGAN ASsocs., THE BUSINESS OF BASEBALL 1996, at 44 (1996)).
7 See Curt Flood Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. § 27a (Supp. IV 1998).
8 See id.; see also Part of Baseball's Antitrust Exemption Is Overturned: President
Clinton Signs the Curt Flood Act of 1998, Which Puts Baseball on Par with Other Sports,
L.A. TIMES, Oct. 28, 1998, at D7.
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II. OVERVIEW OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF ANTITRUST LAW AND
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE UNITED STATES
This Part gives an overview of antitrust and labor law that will serve as
background material for the remaining discussion in the Note. Subpart IL.A
discusses how antitrust law has evolved in this country as a result of
monopolistic behavior by trusts. Subparts I.B, ll.C, and II.D discuss the means
by which the legislature and the courts solved the problem of the conflict
between collective bargaining under labor law and collective bargaining under
the antitrust laws by creating exemptions from antitrust law for collective
bargaining agreements.
A. The Emergence of Antitrust Law in Response to Monopolies
The period stretching from the 1880s through the early twentieth century
spawned the industrial revolution in the United States.9 Entrepreneurs like John
D. Rockefeller were the catalysts of the greatest example of economic expansion
this nation has ever experienced.10 Taking advantage of the relaxed incorporation
legislation of individual states, 11 tycoons created megacorporations, or "trusts."
From tobacco to whiskey and railroads to oil, the trust was utilized by
entrepreneurs as a means to comer a market and stifle competition. 12
It did not take long for Americans to realize the problems created by the
trust. Journalistic muckrakers such as Upton Sinclair13 and Henry Demarest
Lloyd 14 crusaded against trusts and illuminated their evils to the general public,
and the public outrage created by muckrakers coerced Congress to create
legislation that curbed trust activities which in turn encouraged free trade.15 In
1890, Congress passed the Sherman Act, designed specifically to ban
9 For a general discussion of the Industrial Revolution, see VINCENT ToMPKINS,
AMERICAN ERAS IN THE DEvELOPMENT OF THE UNITED STATES (Karen L. Rood ed., 1997).
10 See PErER COLLIER & DAvID HOROwITz, THE ROCKEFELLERS 36 (1976) (discussing
how John D. Rockefeller established the Standard Oil Trust).
I "See ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., THE INvISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIALREVOLtUTON
IN AMERICAN BUSINESS 250-59 (1977).
12 See id.
13 Upton Sinclair is most famous for his novel The Jungle, a study of the stockyards of
Chicago during the turn of the century which lead to the passage of the pure food laws. See
generally UPTON SINCLAIR, THE JUNGLE (Penguin Books 1982) (1906).
14 Henry Demarest Lloyd is considered the "original muckraker." An ardent socialist
who fought for the rights of the commoner, Lloyd published many works, the most well-
known of which is HENRY DEMAREST LLOYD, WEALTH AGAINST COMMONWEALTH (1890).
15 See E. THOMAS SuLLIvAN & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, POLICY AND
PROCEDURE 32-33 (2d ed. 1989).
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conspiracies created to restrain trade and to prohibit the monopolization of
trade. 16
B. Collective Bargaining Under Labor Law Collides with Antitrust Law
While the creation of antitrust legislation was developed to break trade
monopolies, the laws had the unfortunate and unanticipated result of labeling
labor unions as conspiracies against free trade. In Loewe v. Lawlor,17 the hatters'
union of Connecticut used its influence over hat finishing manufacturers and
distributors to prevent them from soliciting business from the plaintiff's
manufacturing company, which maintained a policy of not hiring union
employees.1 8 The company brought suit against the hatters' union, claiming that
the union was a conspiracy against interstate commerce, 19 and the Supreme
Court agreed by holding that the hatter's union conspired to restrict trade
between the plaintiffs company and his customers. 20 Thus, when the Court held
that the hatter's union was violating the antitrust laws, it was stating, in effect,
that unionization was a conspiracy against trade.
C. Congress to the Rescue: The Statutory Exemption of Collective
Bargaining from the Antitrust Laws
In response to Loewe, Congress enacted statutory exemptions in order to
protect management and union negotiations from being found illegal under
antitrust law. First, the Clayton Act of 1914 established that labor is not an article
of interstate commerce and is not within the restrictive scope of the Sherman
Act.21 Furthermore, in 1932, the Norris-LaGuardia Act supplemented the
Clayton Act by creating a federal policy favoring organized labor.22 Finally, in
1935, Congress created the National Labor Relations Act 23 (NLRA), which
established a federal policy favoring the collective bargaining process between
labor and management. 24
The NLRA was created by Congress to protect workers from unfair labor
16 See Sherman Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
17 208 U.S. 274 (1908). This case is better known as the "Danbury Hat" case.
18 See id. at 287.
19 See id. at 292-93.
20 See id.
21 See Clayton Act § 27, 15 U.S.C. § 7 (1994).
22 See Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-108 (1994).
23 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (1994).
24 See id.
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practices, to oversee the elections of union representatives, and to enforce
collective bargaining agreements between players and owners.25 The NLRA
established the National Labor Relations Board26 (NLRB) to implement the
provisions of the NLRA, to review questions on what labor-management issues
fall under the collective bargaining laws of the NLRA, and to decide which labor
groups should enjoy coverage under the NLRA. 27
The NLRB has established three types of labor-nanagement issues, as
follows: (1) mandatory subjects, (2) permissive subjects, and (3) illegal
subjects.28 Mandatory bargaining subjects are those subjects that are required by
law to be negotiated during a collective bargaining agreement; such subjects
include wages, hours, and working conditions.29 Permissive bargaining subjects
are subjects for which the owners and workers may wish to bargain but are not
required to do so. 30 Illegal subjects are labor-worker relations about which it is
illegal to negotiate. 31
D. The Courts to the Rescue: The Nonstatutory Exemption from Antitrust
Law
The Supreme Court also has played a role in the isolation of the collective
bargaining process from antitrust law. In United Mine Workers v. Pennington,
32
the Court acknowledged that agreements created through the collective
bargaining process were exempt from antitrust law. In Pennington, the plaintiffs
in the case, the United Mine Workers of America, initiated a claim against the
defendants, owners of a coal factory, for the payment of royalties.33 The
defendants counterclaimed, alleging that the plaintiffs were engaging in illegal
monopolistic conduct by implementing a collectively bargained wage scale that
exceeded the financial ability of some coal mining operators. 34 Justice White's
opinion stated that the United Mine Workers of America were permitted to
bargain such a wage-scale agreement, and he explicitly stated that "the Clayton
Act and the Norris-LaGuardia Act permit a union, acting alone, to engage in
25 See id.
26 See id. §§ 153, 159-160.
27See id.
28 See PAuLD. STAUDOHAR, THE SPORTS INDUSTRY AND COLLECrIvE BARGAINING 110
(2d ed. 1989).
29 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 151, 158 (1994).
30 See STAUDOHAR, supra note 28, at 11.
31 See id.
32 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
33 See id. at 657.
34 See id. at 659.
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conduct.., without violating the Sherman Act."'35 Thus, in Pennington, the
Court created a nonstatutory exemption for collective bargaining arrangements
from antitrust law.
E. Conclusion
In sum, antitrust law applies to any action by business associations that
affects interstate commerce. 36 However, the statutory exemptions from antitrust
law established by the Clayton Act, the Norris-LaGuardia Act, and the NLRA,
as well as the nonstatutory labor exemption created by the Supreme Court,
immunize any agreements created by labor and management via the collective
bargaining process from antitrust analysis. Because professional sports also have
been deemed a part of interstate commerce and thus are subject to antitrust law, 37
any restraints on trade in professional sports must be the result of collective
bargaining agreements between owners and players.
HI. BASEBALL'S ANTITRUST EXEMPTION: THE BASEBALL TRILOGY
Until the Curt Flood Act of 1998, baseball was the only professional sports
league in the United States to enjoy antitrust exemption status. While other sports
aspired to attain a similar status, the courts were adamant in reserving this
privilege only for Major League Baseball. The history of the antitrust exemption
for Major League Baseball will be elucidated in this Part through a discussion
of the following three Supreme Court cases, known collectively as the "baseball
trilogy": Federal Baseball Club, Inc. v. Federal League of Professional Baseball
Clubs,38 Toolson v. New York, 39 and Flood v. Kuhn.40
A. Federal Baseball Club, Inc. v. National League of Professional
Baseball Clubs
The antitrust exemption of the professional baseball leagues first was
encountered in Federal Baseball Club, Inc. v. National League of Professional
35 Id. at 662.
36 See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 282 (1972).
37 See, e.g., United States v. International Boxing Club, Inc., 348 U.S. 236, 243 (1955)
(holding that the promotion of sporting events on a multistate basis and the selling of rights
to televising, broadcasting, and filming sporting contests constitutes "trade or commerce"
within the meaning of the Sherman Act).
38 259 U.S. 200 (1932).
39 346 U.S. 356 (1953).
40 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
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Baseball Clubs. In Federal Baseball, the plaintiff, the Federal Baseball Club of
Baltimore, was a member of the Federal League of Professional Baseball Clubs
and brought suit against the National League of Professional Baseball Clubs, the
American League of Professional Baseball Clubs, and the National Commission
(an organization which caried out agreements between the two leagues), alleging
that the defendants were conspiring to restrain trade by buying out constituent
teams of the Federal League and somehow inducing them to leave the Federal
League.41 The Court stated that because baseball exhibitions were"purely state
affairs," professional baseball was not a part of interstate commerce and was not
subject to the Sherman Act.42 In its rationale, the Court stated that despite the
fact that individuals were crossing state lines to participate in baseball
exhibitions, such traveling was "mere incident" to the baseball exhibition, which
was itself outside the meaning of "'trade or commerce.' 43
B. Toolson v. New York Yankees
The issue of baseball's antitrust status again came into question in 1953,
when George Toolson challenged baseball's reserve system as a violation of the
Sherman Act. Toolson brought an antitrust suit against the league after he was
blacklisted by the Yankees for refusing to honor his contract and accept his
reassignment to a minor league team.44
The Toolson Court reaffirmed the decision in Federal Baseball; however,
its rationale was different. Rather than stating that baseball was not a part of
interstate commerce, as the Court in Federal Baseball had done, the Court in
Toolson stated that any change to baseball's antitrust status should be
accomplished through Congress, and that Congress's legislative inactivity in this
regard manifested its desire to keep baseball outside the scope of antitrust law.45
Furthermore, the Court also noted the fact that professional baseball had been
operating under the assumption that it was exempt from antitrust law since
Federal Baseball. The Court did not want to create the adverse retroactive
consequences to the operation of baseball that likely would occur if the Court
lifted baseball's antitrust-exempt status.n6
41 See Federal Baseball Club, 259 U.S. at 207.
42Id. at 209.
43 1d. (quoting Sherman Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)).
44 See Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 101 F. Supp. 93,93 (S.D. Cal. 1951), affid,
346 U.S. 356 (1953).
45 See Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356, 357 (1953).
46 See id.
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C. Flood v. Kuhn
In the final case in the baseball trilogy, Flood v. Kuhn, the Supreme Court
again reaffirmed its holdings in Federal Baseball and Toolson, but it rationalized
its decision in a manner different from that set forth by both the Federal Baseball
and Toolson Courts. Curt Flood, an accomplished outfielder for the St. Louis
Cardinals in the 1950s and 1960s, was traded by the Cardinals to the
Philadelphia Phillies without his consent.47 After his request to be made a free
agent was denied by the baseball commissioner, Flood filed an antitrust suit
against the league.48 In his opinion, Justice Blackmun stated that the antitrust
exemption status of baseball was an "anomaly" enjoyed by professional baseball
that catered to its "unique characteristics and needs." 49 Moreover, Justice
Blackmun used the congressional inactivity analysis of the Court in Toolson to
further rationalize professional baseball's exemption from antitrust law. 50
IV. THE EFFECTS OF FEDERAL BASEBALL, TOOLSON, AND FLOOD UPON
MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL
This Part of the commentary will discuss the effects of Federal Baseball,
Toolson, and Flood. In particular, it will discuss how the holdings in the baseball
trilogy were used by the owners to monopolize control over player movement.
Part II.A discusses the "reserve system," the method by which the owners
historically have exerted monopolistic control over player movement. Part llI.B
discusses how the courts have streamlined baseball's antitrust exemption to apply
only to the reserve system.
A. The Reserve System: The Ultimate Player Constraint
The baseball destinies of George Toolson and Curt Flood, discussed above,
were controlled by the owners through the reserve system. The reserve system
is a direct result of baseball's antitrust exemption, and, arising from the baseball
trilogy, it is the most significant method by which the owners were able to
restrain player movement in professional baseball. Essentially, the reserve system
operates by granting owners the unequivocal right to renew a player's contract
under the terms of the previous, expired contract. 51 In other words, when a
47 See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 265 (1972).
48 See id.
49 Id. at 282.
50 See id.
51 See Jonathan M. Conti, The Effect of Salary Arbitration on Major League Baseball,
5 SPORTS LAW. J. 221, 224 (1998).
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player's contract expires, the owners unilaterally may renew the player's contract
despite the fact that the player may deserve a contract more reflective of his
individual talents. The reserve system also was used by the owners to prevent
players from moving from one team to another or from the major league to
another league.52
The reserve system has been the most monopolistic and most self-promoting
action taken by the owners in light of baseball's antitrust exemption. While this
commentary will discuss later the virtual elimination of the reserve system at the
major league level, the reserve system was a powerful method by which the
owners controlled the labor movement among the players, and it continues to
exist undisturbed in the minor leagues.
B. The Franchise Relocation Issue: Piazza v. Major League Baseball
In 1988, the city of Tampa Bay, Florida attempted to lure the Giants
organization of San Francisco into relocating to Tampa Bay.53 The investing
group from Tampa Bay and the owner of the Giants, Robert Lurie, drafted an
exclusivity agreement regarding the sale and relocation of the team and
negotiated its sale for $115 million.54
In response to the negotiations between Tampa Bay and the Giants, the
Ownership Committee for Major League Baseball directed Lurie to consider
offers from other investing groups, and National League President Bill White
invited another individual to participate in the offer and acceptance process. 55
The owners ultimately rejected the Tampa Bay investing group's offer, and Lurie
sold his team to a local investing group for $15 million less than the Tampa Bay
investing firm's offer.56 In response to what he perceived to be a monopolizing
tactic used by the owners, Vincent Piazza, part of the Tampa Bay investment
group, brought an antitrust suit against the National League.57
Piazza asserted that the owners had monopolized the market for team
ownership as well as placed restraints upon the "purchase, sale, transfer,
52 See generally Jonathan C. Tyrns, Players v. Owners: Collective Bargaining and
Antitrust After Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 1 U. PA. LAB. & EMP. L.J. 297 (1998)
(describing how Hal Chase, a member of the 1914 Whitesox, was prevented by the National
Baseball League from switching leagues and playing in the Federal Leagues by the owners).
53 See Piazza v. Major League Baseball, 831 F. Supp. 420, 422 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
54 See id.
55 See id. at 423.
56 See Giants to Remain in San Francisco: Florida Group Denied as N.L Teams Vote
9-4 Against Move, KANsAs CITY STAR, Nov. 11, 1992, at Dl.
57 See Men Who Wanted Giants to Get Their Day in Court, BALTIMoRE SUN, Oct. 9,
1994, at A6.
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relocation of, and competition for such teams" by rejecting Tampa Bay's offer.58
Major League Baseball countered this argument by stating that it was exempt
from any antitrust actions under Federal Baseball and its progeny.59
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
agreed with Piazza and stated that the antitrust exemption afforded to
professional baseball only applied to the reserve clause.60 Thus, the holding of
this court put a severe limitation on the antitrust exemption as applied to Major
League Baseball. While courts have upheld the antitrust exemption as applied
to baseball's reserve system, Piazza has held that the reserve system does not
apply to franchise relocation or expansion. If the issue of relocation or expansion
arises in the future, the holding in Piazza will compel owners to demonstrate
legitimate economic reasons for their decisions regarding where teams should be
located.
V. THE DEVELOPMENT OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN
PROFESSIONAL BASEBALL
The previous Part discussed how baseball's antitrust exemption prevented
individual players from bringing antitrust actions against the owners when the
owners unilaterally implemented restraints on players' ability to play for other
teams. Further, it demonstrated how the antitrust exemption became a powerful
tool for the owners to achieve their economic interests. Eventually, the players
would unite as a collective force and turn to collective bargaining as a means to
wrest control over labor issues from the owners. This Part discusses the evolution
of collective bargaining negotiations in baseball. In particular, subparts A and B
will discuss the history of collective bargaining negotiations that have occurred
over the last thirty years and highlight how control over player movement, salary
restrictions, and other issues have resulted in acrimony between the owners and
the players. Subpart C will investigate theories on why the collective bargaining
process has developed into such a contentious process between the owners and
the players, and it offers suggestions that may make the process more amicable.
A. The Birth of Collective Bargaining in the Baseball Industry
The antitrust exemption status of professional baseball created an imbalance
of bargaining power between labor and management.61 The removal of litigation
58 Piazza, 831 F. Supp. at 422.
59 See id.
60 See id. at 438. Piazza and Major League Baseball eventually settled this dispute out
of court. See Major League Baseball Settles Law Suit, REC. N. N.J., Nov. 3, 1994, at S3.
61 See Erwin G. Kranskow & Herman M. Levy, Unionization and Professional Sports,
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by the Supreme Court as a means of redress for the players against unfair labor
practices by the owners left players with little bargaining leverage, leading many
commentators to urge players to use collective bargaining to countervail the
powers of the owners.62 In response to the threat of unionization, the owners
created a communication system in 1946 to serve as a forum of negotiation
between the players and the management.63 In 1954, the players created the
Major League Baseball Player's Association (MLPBA) to serve as a conduit of
information for the players in the player-owner communication system.64 The
owners would listen to the grievances of the players through the MLPBA and
inform the players of whatever action the club owners were "willing to take"
regarding the players; 65 player and owner interactions operated in this one-sided
manner for over a decade. 66
The emergence of the MLPBA as a legitimate labor union coincided with the
hiring of Marvin Miller as its executive director.67 Many commentators have
called the hiring of Miller the critical moment in the development of the MLPBA
as a legitimate collective bargaining organization. 68 Miller was renowned in the
collective bargaining arena for his service as Chief Bargainer. Before serving as
Chief Bargainer, Miller was the president of the United States Steelworkers of
America for sixteen years and held several positions on presidential labor and
management boards. 69 With Miller at the helm of the MLBPA, the players began
their foray into the collective bargaining process in capable hands, and they saw
their pensions triple, their minimum salary rise from $6,000 to $16,000, and the
average player salary more than double. 70
Coinciding with Miller's hiring was the acknowledgment by the NLRB in
1969 that professional baseball was a part of interstate commerce and thus was
51 GEo. L.J. 749, 758 (1963).
62 See Robert A. McCormick, Baseball's Third Strike: The Triumph of Collective
Bargaining in Professional Baseball, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1131, 1150 (1982) (citing Note, The
Balance of Power in Professional Sports, 22 ME. L. REV. 459, 471 (1970)).
63 See id. at 1151 (citing H.R. Doc. No. 2002, at 38 (1952)); see also LIONEL S. SOBEL,
PROFESSIONAL SPORTS & THE LAW 272 (1977)).
64 See id.
65 Id (citing H.R. Doc. No. 2002, at 176).
66 See id.
67 See SOBEL, supra note 63, at 273.
68 See, e.g., McCormick, supra note 62, at 1152; see also Anthony Sica, Baseball's
Antitrust Exemption: Out of the Pennant Race Since 1972, 7 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA
& ENT. L.J. 295, 328 (1996).
69 See Sica, supra note 68, at 328 (citing ROBERT BERRY ET AL., LABOR RELATIONS IN
PROFESSIONAL SPORTS 53 (1986)).
70 See iL (citing BERRY ET AL., supra note 69, at 53).
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under the jurisdiction of the NLRB and subject to the provisions of the NLRA. 71
The NLRB previously had declined to assert its jurisdiction over Major League
Baseball because of the Supreme Court's decisions in Federal Baseball and
Toolson.72 This ruling by the NLRB officially granted professional baseball
players the basic labor relations rights, set forth in the NLRA, to self-
organization, to bargain collectively through chosen representatives, and to
participate in "concerted activities" for the benefit of employees.73 The finding
that professional baseball was under the jurisdiction of the NLRB was a major
victory for the players because they now were protected officially under labor
law against the unfair practices of the owners, a protection which was not
impacted by the game's antitrust exemption status.
B. The History of Collective Bargaining Between the Player's Union and
the Owner's Organizations
Collective bargaining has been an effective tool for the MLBPA in its
attempt to shift the balance of bargaining power the owners previously had
maintained. Since the first collective bargaining agreement by players in 197074
and their first player strike in 1972, 75 collective bargaining has been the primary
method by which players and owners have negotiated key employment issues.
An examination of the history of collective bargaining in baseball illustrates the
key issues that have caused a rift between the owners and the players, and it will
highlight the main bargaining positions being contended during the negotiation
process.
71 See McCormick, supra note 62, at 1152 (citing American League of Prof 1 Baseball
Clubs & Ass'ns of Nat'l Baseball League Umpires, 180 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 190, 190-91
(1969)).
7 2 See id.
73 National Labor Relations Act § 8, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1994).
74 The first player-owner collective bargaining agreement created a tripartite grievance
arbitration panel headed by an impartial chairman; before this collective bargaining
agreement any final decisions regarding player grievances were decided by the baseball
commissioner, effectually an employee of the owners. See Sica, supra note 68, at 329 (citing
STAUDOHAR, supra note 28, at 25).
75 The first strike instituted by the MLPBA, which lasted 13 days, occurred when
players demanded an increase in their pension. The strike ended when the players and team
owners reached an agreement that increased players' pensions by $500,000. See McCormick,
supra note 62, at 1153 (citing STAUDOHAR, supra note 28, at 110).
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1. The 1973 Collective Bargaining Negotiations: The Elimination of
the Reserve Clause
In 1973, the players and owners negotiated a new collective bargaining
agreement that included as one of its provisions an arbitration system that would
allow players to submit salary disputes for arbitration by an impartial judge.76
This agreement between the players and the owners not only "end[ed] the
management's powerful authority to determine salaries unilaterally, leaving a
dissatisfied player only two options: accept the offer or quit the game" 77; the
agreement also served as the players' method to cripple the reserve clause.
As stated above, the reserve clause allowed the owners to renew the expired
contract of a player for one year in the event that a new contractual agreement
could not be struck.78 Through the new arbitration process established by the
1973 collective bargaining agreement, two players, Andy Messersmith of the Los
Angeles Dodgers and Dave McNally of the Montreal Expos, backed by the
Player's Union, challenged the reserve system after being denied free agency.79
The dispute between the Players' Association and the owners revolved around
the "renewal year" provision. According to the Players' Association, the reserve
system's renewal year provision only granted the owners the right to renew the
players' original contract for one year, after which they became free agents.80
The owners, on the other hand, contended that the renewal clause granted them
the right to renew perpetually the players' original contracts every year until a
new agreement was forged or until they granted a player permission to become
a free agent. 81 Peter Seitz, head arbitrator, found in favor of Messersmith and
McNally and stated that while the owners and players rightfully could have
bargained for the perpetual right to renew a contract on an annual basis, such a
right could not be read impliedly into the contract. 82 When the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed Seitz's decisions, the players struck a significant blow
against the owners control over player movement.8 3 Seitz's revolutionary
decision that the renewal clause was not perpetual fundamentally altered the
76See id. at 1154.
77 Id.
78 See id. at 1155.
79 See Sica, supra note 68, at 330 (citing Peter N. Katz, A History of Free Agency in the
United States and Great Britain: Who's Leading the Charge?, 15 CoNT. LAB. L.J. 371, 381
n.58 (1994)).
80 See McCormick, supra note 62, at 11.55.
81 See In re Twelve Clubs Comprising Nat'l League of Prof'l Baseball Clubs, 66 Lab.
Arb. Rep. (BNA) 101, 101 (Dec. 23, 1975).
82 See id. at 113, 114.
83 See Sica, supra note 68, at 332.
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century-long tradition of the reserve system and in doing so significantly evened
the bargaining power between the players and the owners. 84
2. The 1976 Collective Bargaining Negotiations: The Owner's
Emerging Concerns
With the Messersmith and McNally decisions on their minds, the owners
entered the 1976 collective bargaining agreement negotiations with the intent of
stopping the momentum that the players had gained. Fearing the implications of
free agency upon player movement and escalating salaries, as well as the effect
of shifting competitive advantage towards teams with more capital, 85 the owners
aggressively entered the collective bargaining negotiations and struck a deal
which bound players to their respective teams for six years, including a renewal
option for one year.86 In return, the owners conceded to increases in the players'
pension funds as well as a raise in the players' minimum salaries. 87 However,
before the dust settled, the owners instituted a seventeen day lockout to force the
players' hand. The 1976 collective bargaining negotiations manifested the
concern that the owners had for the players' gains and the battles engaged in by
the owners and the players over the issues of player movement and rapidly
escalating salaries. These negotiations foreshadowed how these issues would
dominate future collective bargaining agreements.
3. The 1980 Collective Bargaining Negotiation: The Players "Strike"
Back at the Owners
While the 1976 collective bargaining agreement seemed to represent
equitable concessions from both sides, salaries rose sharply after the
agreement, 88 and the owners aggressively entered the 1981 negotiations with the
intention of implementing a strategy to curb salary growth.89 The strategy was
a compensatory system that would compensate teams that were losing players via
free agency and a wage scale providing minimum and maximum salaries for
84 See McCormick, supra note 62, at 1156.
85 See Sica, supra note 68, at 333 (citing BERRY ET AL., supra note 69, at 61; KENNETH
M. JENNINGS, BALLS AND STRIKES 35-37 (1990)).
86 See BERRY ET AL., supra note 69, at 61.
87 See id.
88 See Thomas J. Hopkins, Arbitration: A Major League Effect on Player's Salaries,
2 SETON HALLI. SPORTL. 301, 312 (1992).
89 See id. at 334 (citing BERRY ET AL., supra note 69, at 62; JENNINGS, supra note 85,
at 39).
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players with less than six years in the league.90 However, the MLBPA viewed
the provisions proposed by the owners as a conspiracy against player freedom of
movement and countered with a proposal for a further reduction of the
requirements for free agency.91 Owners and players maintained hard-line stances
and did not agree to a new collective bargaining agreement until July 31, 1981,92
one and one-half years after the expiration of the 1976 collective bargaining
agreement. A new collective bargaining agreement was reached only after two
player strikes and much acrimonious negotiation.93
Again, player movement was the focus of the collective bargaining
agreement that was agreed upon on July 31, 1981 after a fifty-day strike
commenced by the MLBPA.94 The new collective bargaining agreement featured
90 See icL (citing Thomas Boswell, Baseball Owners Set up a Sweet Trap, WASH. POST,
Feb. 8, 1980, at Fl).
91 See id. at 335 (citing JENNINGS, supra note 85, at 43).
92 The 1976 collective bargaining agreement expired on January 1, 1980, and no
agreement had been reached between the owners and the players by March of that year. As
a result, the players authorized the use of a player strike during the season. See id. (citing
JENNINGS, supra note 85, at 45; Thomas Boswell, Baseball Players Authorize a Strike,
WASH. POST, Mar. 5, 1980, at Dl). When the owners, in an attempt to ward off the player
strike, took the wage scale proposal off of the table on March 18, 1980, the players agreed
to postpone the commencement of the strike until Memorial Day weekend. See Sica, supra
note 68, at 335 (citing David Kindred, Players Call off Rest of Exhibition Baseball Games,
WASH. POST, Apr. 2, 1980, at Dl; Shirley Povich, What Miller Wants Is Usually What
Players Get, WASH. POST, Apr. 13, 1980, at Ni). After submitting their differences to
mediation as a result of an inability to come to an agreement, the two sides agreed to
continue the season according to the old collective bargaining agreement and to postpone
discussions regarding the compensation issue until the future. See id. (citing Jane Leavy,
Baseball's Strike Is Almost Certain After Talks Stall, WASH. POST, May 22, 1980, at DI).
This labor agreement also created a joint labor/management committee that would make
recommendations to the owners regarding the issue of free agency. See id. at 336 (citing
BERRY ET AL., supra note 69, at 66). If no agreement was reached after the report of the joint
labor/management committee, the owners were empowered unilaterally to adopt their
original 1980 compensation proposal, see id. (citing Jane Leavy, Strike Is off, Study Set on
Compensation, WASH. POST, May 24, 1980, at Cl [hereinafter Leavy, Strike Is off]), at
which time the players could accept the proposal, accept the proposal only for the 1981 draft
with the possibility of striking, or commence a strike on June 1, 1981, see id. The committee
did not reach an agreement, and the owners, on February 1, 1981, see id., commenced their
free agency compensation plan, see id. at 337 (citing Red Smith, A Shot Heard Round
Baseball, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 1981, at B9). As a consequence, the player's union voted to
strike on May 29, 1981, and the strike began on June 12, 1981. See id. (citing Murray Chass,
Long Strike Is Feared as Baseball Shuts Down, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 1981, § 1, at 1).
93 See Leavy, Strike Is off, supra note 92, at Cl.
94 See Sica, supra note 68, at 337 (citing Murray Chass, Strike over, Baseball Resumes
August 9, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 1981, § 1, at 1; Jane Leavy, Baseball Begins Again on August
9, WASH. POST, Aug. 1, 1981, at Al).
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a new free agent system that would compensate teams that were losing players
via free agency while allowing player mobility. This free agent system was based
upon two pools of players, designated as "pool A" and "pool B"; players were
designated as "A" players or "B" players depending upon their performance in
the previous two years.95 The significance of the latter designation was in the
different compensation to a team for loss of a given player of a given
designation. For instance, a team that lost a player designated as an "A" player
would receive as compensation an extra selection in the subsequent year's
amateur draft, as well as a player from the compensation pool of players. 96
Teams that lost a player designated as a "B" player would receive as
compensation two extra selections in the year's amateur draft. 97
The 1981 collective bargaining negotiations process elucidates the use of the
strike by the MLBPA as a hard-line response to what it viewed as an undesirable
labor proposal. The strike has been the players' hard-line bargaining tactic-their
trump card--ever since.
4. The 1985 Collective Bargaining Negotiations: The Salary
Cap/Revenue-Sharing System Rears Its Ugly Head
Despite the provisions in the 1981 collective bargaining agreement that were
designed to curtail player salary growth, the players' salaries continued to
escalate, and the 1985 collective bargaining agreement negotiations manifested
a shift in the owners priority from free agency compensation to decreasing the
rate of escalating salary growth. 98 In order to accomplish this objective, the
owners proposed to implement a salary cap/revenue-sharing system to limit
salary growth,99 much to the chagrin of the players. As expected, the issue of a
95 See id. (citing Thomas Boswell, Owners Pay Maximum for Minimal Victory, WASH.
PosT, Aug. 2, 1981, at F6; Chass, supra note 94, § 1, at 1; Leavy, supra note 94, at Al; Red
Smith, The Fight That Nobody Won, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 2, 1981, § 5, at 5).
96 See Leavy, Strike Is off, supra note 92, at C1. The compensation pool of players
consisted of an aggregate pool of all but 24 players of any team that signed an "A" player.
See id.
97 See id.
98 See Sica, supra note 68, at 338 (citing BERRY ET AL., supra note 69, at 262). The
1985 collective bargaining agreement negotiations began at the end of the 1984 season, after
the 1981 agreement ended. See id.
99 Salary cap provisions in professional sports establish maximum team salaries based
on a predetermined percentage of the defined gross revenues of the league. As gross
revenues of the league increase, the players' salaries increase at a rate proportional to the
predetermined percentage. Salary caps in sports are part of a complex player-owner revenue-
sharing agreement whereby the players receive a guaranteed share in aggregate league
revenues, and the owners of large market franchises (i.e., moneymaking franchises), whose
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salary cap/revenue-sharing system became a major sticking point during the
negotiations. When negotiations stalled during the 1985 season, the players again
went on strike for two days,100 forcing the owners to take the salary cap provision
off of the negotiating table. 10 1 Finally, both sides forged an agreement. The
owners, in return for limits on a player's opportunity for salary arbitration to a
three-year qualification, agreed to increase the minimum salary and granted the
players a portion of revenue profits.10 2 Furthermore, the new agreement called
for the return of the pre-1981 bargaining agreement provision that only
compensated draft choices as a means of compensation for losses in free
agency.103
Frustrated with the inability of collective bargaining, free agency
compensation, and restrictions on player mobility to curb the growth of player
salaries, the owners decided to take matters into their own hands and adopted a
policy not to offer contracts to free agents. 104 This policy was evident in the fact
that after the 1985 season, fifty-seven free agent players out of sixty-two resigned
with their original teams for contracts less than their original teams had
offered. 105 In response, the then and current president of the MLBPA, Donald
Fehr, submitted arbitration grievances against the owners, which became known
as Collusion I, Collusion I, and Collusion III, and which stated that the owners
had conspired against the players and were implementing unfair labor
profits presumably would increase by virtue of the cap, distribute revenue to club owners in
the smaller markets. See Thomas C. Picher, Baseball's Antitrust Exemption Repealed: An
Analysis of the Effect on Salary Cap and Salary Taxation Provisions, 7 SETON HALL J.
SPORTL. 5, 37 (1997).
100 When negotiations between the players and the owners slowed to a halt in July of
1985, the players set a date for a player's strike to begin on August 6, 1985. See Sica, supra
note 68, at 338 (citing Ross Newhan, Players Set the Strike Date: August 6, L.A. TIMEs, July
16, 1985, at 3-1). After no agreements were made regarding the major impasses at issue, a
two-day strike commenced. See id.
101 See id.
102 See id. (citing BERRY ET AL, supra note 69, at 265-66; JENNINGS, supra note 85, at
65; Murray Chass, Baseball Strike Is Settled; Games to Resume Today, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
8, 1985, at Al; Kenneth Reich, Baseball Strike Settled; Play to Resume Today, L.A. TIES,
Aug. 8, 1985, at 1-1).
103 See id. at 339 (citing BERRY Er AL., supra note 69, at 265-67; Chass, supra note
102, at Al; Reich, supra note 102, at 1-1). This concession was made by the owners, in part,
because the compensation system of the 1981 collective bargaining agreement only resulted
in eight players being awarded as compensation, a curious result considering the
aggressiveness with which the owners had negotiated regarding this issue. See id.
104 See id. at 340 (citing JERRY GORMAN & KIRK CALHOUN, THE NAME OF THE GAME
153 (1994)).
105 See id.
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practices. 10 6 The arbitrators agreed with the MILBPA in the summer of 1990,
stating that the owners were in violation of the 1985 collective bargaining
agreement and were liable to pay the players $280 million in damages by
December 31, 1990.107 Collusions I, II, and Ill demonstrate how the collective
bargaining process was not satisfying the owners' objectives. Furthermore, and
more importantly, Collusions I, II, and III exemplify the owners' occasional bad
faith bargaining to achieve their goals as well as the burgeoning bitterness
between the owners and players.
5. The 1990 Collective Bargaining Negotiations: A New and
Improved Bargaining Process?
When the 1985 collective bargaining agreement expired, the owners again
focused their attention on the ever-increasing player salaries and proposed for the
new collective bargaining agreement a new salary system based upon revenue
sharing. 10 8 Viewing the proposal as a form of salary cap, the players rejected the
revenue-sharing system proposal, prompting the owners to implement a lockout
on February 15, 1990.109 Eventually, on March 18, 1990, the parties resumed
talks110 and agreed upon a new collective bargaining agreement; the owners
removed the possibility of the implementation of a salary cap from the bargaining
table111 and agreed to the players' proposal for liberalized salary arbitration, 11 2
106 See id.
107 See id. at 341 (citing GORMAN & CALHOUN, supra note 104, at 154).
108 See id. (citing Murray Chass, Chill of Labor Impasse Threatens Baseball's Spring,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 1990, at Al). The players' average salaries had increased dramatically
since the emergence of free agency in 1976; for example, in 1984 the average salaries were
more than six times higher than the average salary before the 1976 collective bargaining
agreement, and the top players' salaries were as high as $2 million per season. See id. The
new salary system proposed by the owners would give players 48% of the gross income from
ticket sales as well as television and radio rights, to be distributed to players through a wage
scale. See id. at 342. Distributions to players with less than six years experience would be
determined in part by an index of performance, while distributions to players with more than
six years experience would be free to negotiate their contracts, limited by the team's
determined payroll. See id.
109 See id. (citing Murray Chass, Negotiations Exchange Outlooks on Talks, N.Y.
TIMEs, Feb. 16, 1990, at A26; Helene Elliot, The Sounds of Silence Haunt Those Waiting for
Angels to Take the Field, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 16, 1990, at C8; Richard Justice, Negotiators Hit
Salary Arbitration; Baseball Camps Closed as Talks Narrow Focus, WASH. POST, Feb. 16,
1990, at Fl).
110 See id. at 343 (citing Murray Chass, Baseball's Labor Dispute Settled with
Compromise on Arbitration, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 1990, at Al; Ross Newhan, Lockout
Ends, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 19, 1990, at Cl).
111 See id.
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while the players accepted the owners' terms regarding minimum salaries and
salary arbitration. 113 Furthermore, the parties agreed that renegotiation could
reopen on the issues of free agency, arbitration, and minimum salaries after three
years.1 14 For the first time during the twenty years of collective bargaining
between the owners and the players, both sides approached the negotiations with
the perception that good faith bargaining was necessary for the sport.
The optimism created by the atypically smooth 1990 negotiations was short-
lived, however. In December of 1992, the owners' voted to reopen the agreement
during the 1993 season to discuss the issues of free agency, salary arbitration,
and minimum salary. 115 Negotiations continued throughout the 1993 and 1994
seasons, despite the fact that the 1990 collective bargaining agreement expired
on December 31, 1993, after the 1993 season had ended.1 16 Finally, on July 19,
1994, towards the end of the season, the players instituted a strike to begin on
August 12, 1994, and the owners as a result canceled the season after almost two
years of acrimonious negotiations. 117 The strike lasted for seven months, 118
cutting off 75 regular season games as well as the World Series.119 During this
112 See id. (citing, inter alia, Joseph Durso, Back to Work with Mixed Reviews, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 20, 1990, at B 15). This salary arbitration agreement provided that players with
two years of experience would be eligible for arbitration. See id.
113 See id.
114 See id. (citing Murray Chass, Baseball Negotiators Cleaning up Loose Ends, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 20, 1990, at Bll).
115 See id. at 343-44 (citing Murray Chass, Baseball Owners Vote to Reopen Labor
Talks, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 1992, at B17; Mark Maske, Baseball Owners Reopen Labor
Talks; Spring Lockout Uncertain, WASH. POST, Dec. 8, 1992, at El; Mark Maske, Chance
of Lockout Downplayed; Negotiator Says Owners Want Salary Cap Based on Revenue,
WASH. POST, Jan. 14, 1993, at D1; Ross Newhan, Baseball Lockout Deemed Unlikely;
Negotiations: Owners' Representative Reopens Bargaining by Saying He Will Recommend
Against Hostile Threats, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 14, 1993, at C2).
116 See id. at 344-45.
117 See id. at 345 (citing Murray Chass, No Runs, No Hits, No Errors: Baseball Goes
on Strike, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 1994, at Al; Richard Justice, With Baseball's Last Out, a
Strike; Players Walk off Job After Failing to Agree with Owners, WASH. POST, Aug. 12,
1994, at Al; Ross Newhan, Owners Gripe as Baseball Strike Begins, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 12,
1994, at Al). Again, the source of the strike was the owners' attempt to implement a salary
cap system. See id, (citing Murray Chass, Owners and Players Stand Still; Clock Runs, N.Y.
TIMES, July 19, 1994, at B9; Richard Justice, Strike All but Certain; Baseball Players,
Owners Won't Yield on Salary Cap, WASH. POST, July 19, 1994, at El; Ross Newhan,
Players' Union Rejects Owners' Salary Cap; Negotiations Will Continue Wednesday, but
a Strike Date Is Expected by July 31, L.A.TIMES, July 19, 1994, at C4).
118 See Joseph A. Kohm, Jr., Baseball's Antitrust Exemption: It's Going,
Going... Gone!, 20 NOVA L. REV. 1231, 1232 (1996).
119 See id.
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strike, the conflict escalated even further when each side accused the other of
failing to bargain in good faith and filed grievances with the NLRB. 120 The strike
was costly to owners, players, and fans alike-revenue losses were estimated at
$1 billion. 121 Furthermore, baseball's image as America's pastime was tarnished.
Intervention from President Bill Clinton 122 and an injunction issued by a federal
court saved baseball by coercing negotiations and ordering the owners to
implement temporarily the terms of the expired 1990 collective bargaining
agreement.123
These negotiations, perhaps more than any other negotiations, demonstrate
how opposed owners and players have become as far as labor issues are
concerned. During this conflict, the players absolutely were resolved not to
surrender any of the freedoms they obtained through collective bargaining, and
the owners, in the face of excessive costs, absolutely were resolved to take
preventative measures at the expense of the players.
6. The 1996 Collective Bargaining Negotiations: A Tenuous Peace
Between Owners and Players
After four years of bitter negotiations, the owners and players finally agreed
upon a collective bargaining agreement covering the period between 1996 and
2000 to replace the previous collective bargaining agreement, which had been
extended beyond its terms in order to avoid the loss of the 1995 season. 124 The
120 See Peter Schmuck, Players, Owners File Grievances with NLRB, BALTIMORE SUN,
Dec. 28, 1994, at 4E. The players filed a grievance with the NLRB, accusing the owners of
failure to bargain in good faith after the owners unilaterally declared an impasse in
negotiations on December 22, 1994 and implemented a salary cap system. See id. The
owners countered, stating that the players failed to bargain in good faith in regards to wages.
See id. Eventually, under pressure from the NLRB, the owners withdrew their
implementation of the salary cap on February 6, 1995, and the NLRB promised in turn not
to issue any complaints against the owners in return for their voluntary lifting of the salary
cap. See Mark Maske, Baseball's Waiting Game: Now Both Sides Cool off, WASH. POST,
Feb.12, 1995, at D1.
121 See Jeffery S. Moorad, Major League Baseball's Labor Turmoil: The Failures of
the Counter-Revolution, 4 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 53, 83 (1997).
122 See id. at 78-79. In a proactive move by the Clinton administration to end the
baseball strike of 1994-1995, President Clinton appointed William Usery, former labor
secretary, to mediate the dispute between the players and the owners in October of 1994. See
id. Usery's eventual failure to resolve the differences between the owners and the players is
discussed briefly below. See infra Part V.D.
123 See Mark Maske, NLRB Votes to Seek Injunction Against Baseball Owners, WASH.
POST, Mar. 27, 1995, at D1.
124 See Stephan Fatsis, Baseball Pact Is Ratified by Owners, WALL ST. J., Nov. 27,
1996, at A3.
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new collective bargaining agreement features concessions for both sides; during
this collective bargaining agreement the players receive an increase in their
minimum salary, as well as time-in-service credit for the seventy-five playing
days they had missed during the 1994 season. In return the owners are permitted
to implement a luxury tax on the five teams having the biggest aggregate player
payrolls125 and player salary taxes, 126 and they will be allowed an increase in the
amounts of revenue sharing.127 Revenues from these sources are pooled and then
divided among small market teams to help these teams compete, given the
current environment favoring player mobility. 128
C. Owners and Players Clear the Benches: The Collective Bargaining
Brawl
While the collective bargaining process eventually has resulted in new
agreements between the players and the owners upon the expiration of each
previous agreement, the process has been, for most part, highly contentious. The
owners vehemently have adopted a bargaining position to abrogate player gains
in "free agency, salary arbitration, and freedom of salary controls" 129 and have
repeatedly bargained in bad faith. 130 The MLBPA, on the other hand, also has
acted contentiously during the collective bargaining process. For example,
Donald Fehr, during the 1994 collective bargaining negotiations, escalated the
MLBPA's hard-line negotiation tactics into hostile negotiation tactics by publicly
criticizing, berating, and insulting the owners.131
Thus, while it is difficult to refute the conclusion that the collective
bargaining process has been ineffective in eventually producing labor agreements
in major league baseball, the collective bargaining process has been detrimental
to the relationship between the players and the owners, and more importantly, it
has eroded fan enthusiasm in America's game. Furthermore, the collective
bargaining process has been expensive for both sides. For example, during the
125 The "luxury tax," imposed upon the five teams with the biggest aggregate payrolls,
will consist of 35% of those teams' payrolls in excess of $51 million. See id The revenues
from these sources will be pooled and then divided among small market teams. See id.
126 See id. The "players' salary tax" will tax players' individual salaries by 2.5%. See
id.
127 See id.
128 See id.
129 Moorad, supra note 121, at 58.
130 See Eric Long, The 1994 Baseball Strike Revisited: A Better Impasse Analysis, 22
S. ILL U. L.J 117, 146 (1995).
131 See Negotiations Regress to Name Calling; Union Chief Goes on'Rampage, Rips
into "Hatchetman" Ravitch, SALT LAKE TRIB., Aug. 23, 1994, at D3.
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1994 strike, the owners lost an estimated $376 billion in attendance revenues in
1994 and $326 billion in lost attendance revenues in 1995.132 On the other hand,
the players lost $243 million in lost wages as a result of games being
cancelled, 133 and numerous ancillary revenue-generating sources were lost, such
as endorsement revenues and similar marketing revenues 134
D. Changing the Collective Bargaining Process: Principled Bargaining
Will Facilitate Baseball's Collective Bargaining
What caused the negotiation process between the owners and players to
develop into a full-scale war? One problem with the negotiation process between
the owners and the players has been that both sides traditionally have used a
positional bargaining technique.1 35 Both the owners and the players view the
negotiation process as a contest 136 ; according to both owners and players, one
side inevitably must win and the other inevitably must lose. This type of
bargaining rationale has lead to both sides responding with myopic positions as
to how the negotiations should end.' 37 To use the 1994 negotiations as an
example, the players entered the negotiation process with the absolute goal of
preventing a salary cap system, while the owners entered the negotiation process
with the fullest intention of forcing the players into agreeing to a salary cap
system. 138 Antagonistic, hard-line positions such as these often lead to hostile
negotiations and bog down the negotiation process because neither side is willing
to compromise. 139 With positional bargaining, both negotiating parties-the
owners and the players-are intent upon producing a favorable result at the
expense of the other party.140
One method of alleviating the hostility between the owners and the MLPBA
would be to change the current bargaining techniques being used by the players
and owners from positional bargaining to principled bargaining. 141 With
132 See Moorad, supra note 121, at 82.
133 See id.
134 See id. at 53, 82.
135 See Christopher Fisher, The 1994-1995 Baseball Strike: A Case Study in Myopic
Subconscious Macroscopic Response to Conflict, 6 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 367, 391
(1996).
136 See id.
137 See id.
138 See id. at 374-75.
139 See id.
14 0 See Steven S. Goldberg & Dixie Snow Huefner, Dispute Resolution in Special
Education: An Introduction to Litigation Alternatives, 99 EDuc. L. REP. 703, 708 (1995).
141 See Fisher, supra note 135, at 373; Roger Fisher & William Jackson, Alternative
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principled negotiations, the objective of the negotiations is to solve a mutual
problem rather than to win a contest against an adversary. 142
Principled negotiation techniques can be described in five basic steps, as
follows: (1) "[s]eparate the people from the problem"; (2) focus on one's own
and the other side's underlying interests rather than insisting upon a bottom-line
position; (3) "invent options for [the] mutual gain" of both parties; (4) use
objective standards and criteria during negotiations; and (5) prepare a best
alternative to a negotiated agreement (BATNA).143
The first step of principled negotiation, separating the people from the
problem, aspires to aid both sides in focusing on the opposing parties as people
and, in doing so, eliminating the possibility of the parties' relationship becoming
entangled with their discussions of substance during the negotiation process.144
Separating the people from the problem can be accomplished through a mutual
understanding by each party of the other party's position145 and the motivations
behind their positions, as well as through the acknowledgment that both parties
have emotions connected to the substantive issues that should not interfere with
the negotiations. 146 Both parties must communicate their needs effectively while
at the same time listening to the other party's needs through fostering a working
relationship that prevents a reversion to positional bargaining. 147
The second step of principled negotiation, focusing on one's interests and
the interests of the opposing party rather than assuming hard-line positions, is
designed to ascertain whether the two parties have any mutual interests between
them. 148 This step is accomplished by parties ascertaining their interests as well
as the interests of the opposing party and by communicating with one another
about these interests. 149
The third step of principled negotiation, inventing options for mutual gain,
focuses upon brainstorming for creative solutions to issues by each party, with
the goal of identifying a mutually appealing option.150 After brainstorming, both
Dispute Resolution and Procedural Justice: Teaching the Skills of Settlement, 46 SMU L.
REv. 1985, 1988 (1993).
14 2 See ROGER FISHER ET AL., GETTING TO YEs: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT
GIvING IN 10-13, 80-100 (Bruce Patton ed., 2d ed. 1991) (describing the process and goals
of principled negotiation).
143 Id.
144 See id. at 22.
145 See id. at 22-26.
146 See id. at 28-36.
147 See id. at 36-39.
148 See id. at 42.
149 See id. at 40-55.
150 See id. at 55-80.
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sides should identify the most promising ideas, invent improvements for
promising ideas, and set up a time to evaluate ideas and decide. 151
The fourth step of the process, insisting on objective standards to determine
necessary facts and figures for the negotiation process, aspires to bring standards
of fairness to produce a final solution that is equitable for both sides. 152
Obtaining objective standards and criteria can be accomplished by both sides
listening to the other side's statements regarding research or by mutually
agreeing upon an expert to provide information. 153
The fifth step of the process, determination of a BATNA, is designed as a
fallback for both parties should a negotiation impasse occur. 154 This step is
designed to identify an alternative measure that will serve as a standard to
compare any proposal from the other side and, more importantly, will serve as
protection for each party's interests upon failure of the negotiations. 155
1. Applying Principled Negotiations to the Collective Bargaining
Process of Baseball
Under the standards of principled negotiations, the players and owners
initially would have to divorce themselves from viewing each other as
competitors in a contest, as they traditionally have done in previous collective
bargaining negotiations. This would be the "separating the people from the
problem" stage of the negotiation process. The goal of this initial step is to
prevent the players and owners from adopting the "us against them" attitude that
in the past has introduced emotion into the bargaining process and has led to very
acrimonious relations and numerous player strikes.
The next step of the negotiation process would be to identify the interests
that the owners and the players may have in common. While the players and the
owners have their own separate interests in maintaining player movement and
cutting costs, respectively, both parties share the mutual interests of fostering
competition between the teams and, most importantly, keeping their fans happy.
Both sides must realize that hard-line positions-namely, the player's desire to
avoid a salary cap/revenue-sharing system and the owners' desire to curb salary
growth-will not result in fulfillment of their mutual goals. Rather, hard-line
positions will lead only to the discussion of self-serving options and frustrate the
process.
After mutual interests have been identified, the players and owners would
151 See id. at 62.
152 See id. at 80.
153 See id. at 82-94.
154 See id. at 97-106.
155 See id. at 98-100.
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have to incorporate the interests of the opposing party (as identified in the first
two steps of the process) into viable collective bargaining options. This is the
"inventing option for mutual gain" tactic of principled negotiations. As
mentioned above, a salary cap/revenue-sharing system, which limits player
movement by limiting the amount that teams may spend on free agents, has been
the primary impasse in recent negotiations. Using the salary cap/revenue-sharing
system as an example, the players should recognize that the owners are going to
propose ideas that will address directly their concern with the rapid growth of
salaries and competition within the league. The owners, on the other hand,
should recognize that the players have fought long and hard for their gains in
player movement and that a salary cap/revenue-sharing system represents a
serious threat to these gains. 156
Using this step in the principled negotiation bargaining process, the owners
and players should be able to determine options in a cooperative fashion that are
appealing to both sides rather than creating agreements after bitter negotiation
and striking. Through this step of the principled bargaining process, the owners
and the players should be able to have an open dialogue about viable options that
satisfy both their goals.
For example, the owners and the players could discuss a change in the
current arbitration system, a system under which the league has been operating
since the 1970s. Indeed, salary arbitration is considered one of the primary
reasons for why salary costs have escalated at such an astounding rate.157 Under
the arbitration system, known as "baseball arbitration, ' 158 a player having
between two and six years of major league experience may file for arbitration if
he cannot agree with his team on how much he should be compensated for his
services. 159 Both the player and team submit what they consider fair
compensation for the player's services to a disinterested arbitrator, and this
arbitrator makes a final decision on what the player should make from the two
submissions. 160 The arbitrator looks at the quality and the consistency of the
contributions of the player to his team, the player's previous salary history,
comparable baseball salaries, the performance of the club, and whether the player
156 See Christopher D. Cameron & J. Michael Echevarria, The Ploys of Summer:
Antitrust, Industrial Distrust, and the Case Agdinst a Salary Cap for Major League
Baseball, 22 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 827, 862-63 (1995).
157 See Marc Chaplin, It Ain't Over 'Til It's Over: The Century Long Conflict Between
the Owners and the Players in Major League Baseball, 60 ALB. L. Rnv. 205, 221 (1996).
158 See Thomas J. Brewer & Lawrence R. Mills, Combining Mediation & Arbitration,
Disp. Ras. 3., Nov. 1999, at 32, 38 (1999).
159 See Conti, supra note 51, at 228.
160 See id. at 228-29.
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has any physical or mental ailments. 161
There are flaws in the current system that are extremely detrimental to the
owners' interests. First, once a player qualifies and elects to arbitrate, the owners
have no other option but to participate. 162 Furthermore, a player utilizing
arbitration virtually always succeeds in receiving a significantly higher salary
than his previous salary permitted. 163 This is due to the fact that the player
typically can submit a significantly higher offer (as compared to his current
salary) to the arbitrator, and an owner, in response, submits an offer that is
typically lower, but still higher than what the player was earning under his
previous contract. 164 No matter what the arbitrator decides, the player makes
significantly more money than he had previous to arbitration because the
arbitrator is bound by the salary range submitted by the players and the owner. 165
One solution to this problem would be to give the arbitrator more leeway in
his or her decision as to how much the player should earn, rather than giving him
only the choice between two offers that reflect polar interests. 166 Such an
arbitration system would allow the arbitrator to decide upon a salary amount that
more accurately reflects the player's true market value. Players still will gain
increases in salary amounts, and owners would not view salary arbitration as a
lose-lose situation. 167 Thus, the arbitration system change represents just one of
many options for mutual gain under this step of principled bargaining that can
help the owners and players better identify mutually beneficial options.
The fourth step of principled bargaining, insisting on objective standards to
determine necessary facts and figures, would require the players and the owners
to rely upon some standard of objective criteria during their negotiations. In the
past, the players and the owners have expressed suspicion about each others'
sources of information,168 and it appears that a source of objective information
161 See HOWARDRAFFA, THE ART AND SCIENCEOFNEGOTIATIONS 103, 110-11 (1982).
162 See Conti, supra note 51, at 232.
163 See id.
164 See id.
165 See id. For example, Randy Velarde, former infielder for the New York Yankees,
was awarded a $1.05 million contract for the 1993 season via arbitration, despite the fact that
Velarde was an average baseball player who, as a part-time player, only played 75% of the
games played in the previous year. See Chaplin, supra note 157, at 205. Despite the fact the
Yankees offered Velarde a 67% increase in salary, the arbitrator nonetheless rewarded
Velarde with a contract that exceeded 290% of Veldarde's 1992 salary of $360,000. See id.
Such egregious increases in a player's income as a result of arbitration-even for average
players like Velarde-are commonplace. See id.
166 See id. at 235.
167 See id.
168 See, e.g., Mark Maske, Owners Study Rebuts Report by the Players, WASH. POST,
Oct. 26, 1994, at Fl. Maske discusses the dispute over management fees paid to owners
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would ease the distrust harbored by both sides. A mediator, selected by both the
players and the owners, could help in the information sharing process. This
objective mediator reminds the parties that previous positional bargaining
techniques have been ineffective in solving their mutual problems and that a less
contentious method of negotiation would better effectuate their goals. 169 The
mediator also can serve as a source of reliable information or select an objective
source of information for both sides. A mediator that serves as a source of
objectivity could inject fairness into the negotiation process, which would foster
the creation of an equitable conclusion. 170
Finally, in the event that an impasse occurs in the negotiation process, both
sides would identify their BATNA. Given the past history of the collective
bargaining negotiations of both parties, it should not be difficult for either side
to determine its BATNA; in fact, neither side has much option. For the owners,
the best alternatives have been a lockout or the unilateral implementation of the
old collective bargaining provisions upon the occurrence of a negotiation
impasse. For the players, the traditional alternative to a negotiating agreement
has been a strike.171 Both BATNAs are strong bargaining tools for their
respective sides, and they have been used in the past by both parties to coerce the
during the collective bargaining negotiations in 1994. See id, During the dispute, the owners
questioned the credibility of the players' union's economist, Roger Noll, while Noll accused
the owners from "hiding large amounts of revenues through excessive general and
administrative expenditures." Id.
169 See generally Cameron Collar Fernandez & Jerry Spolter, International Intellectual
Property Dispute Resolution: Is Mediation a Sleeping Giant?, Disp. RESOL. J., Aug. 1998,
at 62.
170 As mentioned previously, President Clinton appointed mediator William Usery to
mediate the last round of negotiations. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
Unfortunately, Usery was largely unsuccessful in his attempts to coerce the owners and the
players to form a new agreement. See Congress and Baseball, WASH. POST, Feb. 10, 1995,
at A22; Courting a Solution, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Apr. 3, 1995, at 21, 21; Mark Maske,
President Puts Pressure on Baseball; Feb. 6 Deadline Set for Strike Resolution, WASH.
POST, Jan. 27, 1995, at Al; Mark Maske, Usery Plans to Stay Involved; Despite Criticism,
Baseball Negotiator Wants to Continue, WASH. POST, Feb. 6, 1995, at D1. Although why
precisely William Usery was unable to mediate successfully an agreement between the
owners and the players is beyond the scope of this Note, an argument can be made that his
lack of success is grounded in the fact that the owners and the players held their hard-line
positions so firmly that mediation was useless. See, e.g., James R. Devine, The Legacy of
Albert Spalding, the Holdouts of Ty Cobb, Joe DiMaggio, and Sandy Koufax/Don Drysdale,
and the 1994-1995 Strike: Baseball's Labor Disputes Are as Linear as the Game, 31
AKRONL. REv. 1, 73 (1997).
171 However, with the passage of the Curt Flood Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. § 27a (Supp.
IV 1998), the players may have another option in their BATNA arsenal. This possibility will
be discussed in greater detail below.
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other back to the bargaining table.172
Thus, a change from positional bargaining methods to principled negotiation
methods would make the collective bargaining process more efficacious and less
hostile for the players and owners. Principled bargaining would eliminate the
cycle of impasse and strike that has plagued collective bargaining in baseball in
the past by allowing the owners and the players to recognize the interests of the
other side and by allowing them to identify mutually appealing solutions.
Principled bargaining would allow both sides to devise an equitable agreement
that would satisfy the owners' and the players' mutual and individual needs in
maintaining fan interest and competition within the league, all while fostering a
less acrimonious bargaining process.
VI. TiE CURT FLOOD ACT OF 1998 AND ITS IMPLICATIONS ON
NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN OWNERS AND PLAYERS
As discussed earlier, baseball's antitrust exemption was once a powerful
method for the owners to control the economics of baseball. Now that the Curt
Flood Act has been enacted, what role will the antitrust exemption have upon the
relations between the players and the owners? At first glance, one would assume
that the lifting of baseball's antitrust exemption would be a huge victory for the
individual player-he would have the chance to succeed in an antitrust suit
against the league. However, how important is this chance, given the fact that the
owners and the players have been utilizing collective bargaining as a means of
resolving disputes for thirty years? What role will this chance to bring an
antitrust suit have upon the state of collective bargaining? This Part discusses the
provisions of the Curt Flood Act of 1998 in subpart A, and it analyzes how the
lifting of the antitrust-exempt status of baseball will affect the collective
bargaining process of the owners and the MLPBA in subpart B.
A. An Overview of the Curt Flood Act
Over the years, many bills have been introduced to Congress addressing the
subject of baseball's antitrust exemption. Recognizing the need for antitrust laws
to apply to baseball after the disastrous 1994 and 1995 seasons, Senators Orrin
Hatch of Utah, Patrick Leahy of Vermont, Strom Thurmond of South Carolina,
and Daniel Patrick Moynihan of New York introduced a bill entitled "The Curt
Flood Act" to the Judiciary Committee on January 21, 1997.173 After the bill's
172 See supra Part VI.
173 See S. 53, 105th Cong. (1997). See generally 123 CONG. REc. S53,418-20 (daily
ed. Jan. 21, 1997). During the previous 104th Congress, a virtually identical bill, the Major
League Baseball Antitrust Reform Act of 1995, had been reported out of the Judiciary
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introduction, the players and owners during the 1997 collective bargaining
meetings vowed to cooperate in lobbying Congress to create legislation that
would put baseball under the ambit of antitrust law. 174 Recognizing baseball's
willingness to support their bill, Senators Hatch and Leahy communicated with
both the players' union and the owners regarding their willingness to work with
both parties to achieve the expeditious passing of their bill. 175 After an
amendment was added to the Curt Flood Act to clarify that the minor leagues
were not to be in any way affected by the bill, 176 the Judiciary committee voted
upon and approved the Curt Flood Act on July 31, 1997.177 On October 7, 1998,
both the House of Representatives and the Senate passed it, and on October 27,
1998, the President signed the Act into law. 178
The purpose of the Curt Flood Act is "to state that major league baseball
players are covered under the antitrust laws" or, in other words, that "major
league baseball players will have the same rights under the antitrust laws as do
other professional athletes." 179
Section three of the Act is divided into four subsections that define what
conduct may trigger an antitrust suit and what conduct is excluded from the Act,
and they define when a player may bring an antitrust suit under the Act. 180
The first major subsection of the Act defines the type of conduct that may
trigger an antitrust suit as any "conduct, acts, practices, or agreements of persons
in the business of organized professional major league baseball" that are
Committee but was not considered by the full Senate during its 104th session. See S. 627,
104th Cong. (1996).
174 See H.R. REP. No. 105-845, at 100 (1998). The players' and owners' cooperative
efforts ultimately were commemorated in article XXVIII of their Basic Agreement, which
reads:
The Clubs and the Association will jointly request and cooperate in lobbying the
Congress to pass a law that will clarify that Major League Baseball players are covered
under the antitrust laws (i.e., that Major League Players have the same rights under the
antitrust laws as do other professional athletes, e.g., football and basketball players),
along with a provision that makes it clear that passage of that bill does not change the
application of the antitrust laws in any other context or with respect to any other person
or entity.
Id.
175 See id.
176 The amendment reads, "nothing in this subsection shall be construed as providing
the basis for any negative inference regarding the case law concerning the applicability of
the antitrust laws to minor league baseball." Id.
177 See id.
178 See id.
179 Curt Flood Act of 1998 § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 27a note (Supp. IV 1998) (Purpose).
180 See 15 U.S.C. § 27a(a)-(d).
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"directly" related to or that "affect[] employment of major league baseball
players . ... -181
The second major subsection limits the scope of the application of antitrust
law by creating a list of "conduct, acts, practices, or agreements" that do not
create an antitrust act.182 It excludes "conduct, acts, practices, or agreements"
relating to the operation of employment in the minor leagues from antitrust
protection. 183 The Act goes on to exclude any "agreement between organized
professional major league baseball teams and the teams of the National
Association of Professional Baseball Leagues," any agreements between
"professional major league baseball" and the minor league teams, and "any other
matter relating to organized professional baseball's minor leagues.. .. 184
Further, it excludes any conduct relating to "franchise expansion, location or
relocation, franchise ownership issues, including ownership transfers, the
relationship between the Office of the Commissioner and franchise owners," as
well as any "marketing or sales" issues. 185 The Act also excludes any "conduct,
acts, practices, or agreements" protected by the Sports Broadcasting Act of
1961.186 Finally, the Act excludes any agreements between organized
professional baseball and umpires' 87 as well as other employees of major league
baseball who are not "in the business of organized professional major league
baseball." 188
The third major subsection of the Curt Flood Act defines a party that may
bring suit upon a cause of action under its provisions-in other words, it defines
who is a baseball player under this statutory regime. According to this
subsection, a baseball player is anyone who (1) "is a party to a major league
player's contract, or is playing baseball at the major league level"; (2) "was a
party to a major league player's contract or playing baseball at the major league
level at the time" the cause of action arose; (3) "has been a party to a major
league player's contract or who has played baseball at the major league level, and
who claims he has been injured in his efforts to secure a subsequent major league
player's contract by an alleged violation of antitrust laws"; or (4) "was a party to
a major league player's contract or who was playing baseball at the major league
level at the conclusion of the last full championship season" before the
181 Id. § 27a(a).
182 Id. § 27a(b).
183 Id. § 27a(b)(1).
184 Id. § 27a(b)(2).
185 Id. § 27a(b)(3).
186 Id. § 27a(b)(4); see also Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1291-1295
(1994).
187 See 15 U.S.C. § 27a(b)(5).
188 Id. § 27a(b)(6).
[Vol. 15:2 2000]
CURRENT STATE OF PLAYER-OWNER COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
"expiration of the last collective bargaining agreement .... "189
The Act further states that minor league players may bring an antitrust suit
if the alleged "conduct, acts, practices, or agreements" that the player bases his
action upon relate to baseball at the major league level and the "conduct, acts,
practices, or agreements" relate to or affect employment of "major league
baseball players" to play baseball at the major league level.1 90
B. The Impact That the Curt Flood Act Will Have on Professional
Baseball
1. Is an Antitrust Action Under the Curt Flood Act a Legitimate
Threat Against the Owners?
Theoretically, when the 1996 collective bargaining agreement expires later
this year, the MLBPA will have an opportunity to utilize the threat of an antitrust
claim against the owners as a tool in gaining major concessions during the next
collective bargaining agreement negotiations. However, is the threat of antitrust
action by the players real, or is an antitrust action under the Curt Flood Act of
1998 an idle one?
One important caveat to the use of antitrust action by the players is that the
alleged misconduct must not apply to issues covered under the current collective
bargaining agreement. The Eighth Circuit established this rule in Mackey v.
National Football League.191 In Mackey, the defendant, Pete Rozelle,
commissioner of the National Football League, implemented the so-called
"Rozelle Rule" to resolve free agent compensation disputes.1 92 According to the
Rozelle Rule, the Commissioner had the final decision regarding the
compensation of one team to another team for the loss of a free agent player if
an adequate means of compensation could not be negotiated.1 93 Several players
filed suit against the league, claiming that the Rozelle rule was "an illegal
combination and conspiracy in restraint of trade denying professional football
players the right to freely contract for their services." 194
The Eighth Circuit held that in order for a player to bring an antitrust claim
against the league, he must demonstrate the following: (1) that the restraint of
trade alleged was beyond the scope of the collective bargaining agreement; (2)
189 Id. § 27a(c).
190 Id. § 27a(d)(2).
191 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976).
192 See id. at 606, 609 n.1.
193 See id.
194 Id. at 609.
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that the restraint on trade does not effect a mandatory subject of collective
bargaining; and (3) that the agreement is not a result of arm's length
bargaining. 195 In Mackey, the court held that the players could bring an antitrust
suit against the league because the Rozelle Rule was not a product of arm's
length negotiations.196
Accordingly, a professional baseball player aspiring to bring an antitrust
claim must fulfill the criteria of the three-part test as elucidated in Mackey. In
other words, the player would have to demonstrate that the alleged misconduct
by the owners was not part of the collective bargaining process and was not
protected by the nonstatutory labor exemption.
A baseball player wishing to bring an antitrust suit against the owners may
find it difficult to demonstrate that any given potential cause of action was
outside the collective bargaining process, given the long history of collective
bargaining between the players and owners. First, in any issue that a player may
be litigating, the parties involved in the litigation would in all likelihood involve
the players and the owners, the very parties to the collective bargaining
agreement. 1 7 Second, the issues of an antitrust suit by a player most likely
would concern the terms and conditions of his employment, which are mandatory
subjects of collective bargaining in professional sports. 198 Third, because
baseball has relied upon collective bargaining to resolve key economic labor
issues, a player would, in all likelihood, encounter difficulty in arguing that the
terms and conditions of his employment were not forged through the collective
bargaining process. 199 Therefore, it would appear that the nonstatutory
exemption would be a major impediment to an antitrust action by a player during
the existence of any collective bargaining agreement.
The holdings in two cases, National Basketball Association v. Williams2°°
and Brown v. Pro Football, Inc.,201 further clarify the Eighth Circuit's ruling in
Rozelle as to when a professional sports player may bring an antitrust suit against
the owners by defining when and how long collective bargaining actually exists.
With the decisions in Williams and Brown, the courts have added to the
proverbial hoops that a player must jump through before he will have an
opportunity to bring an antitrust suit against the owners.
Before these two cases, the question of when the nonstatutory labor
195 See id. at 614.
196 See id. at 616.
197 See Kohm, supra note 118, at 1247.
198 See id.
199 See id.
200 45 F.3d 684 (2d Cir. 1995).
201 518 U.S. 231 (1996).
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exemption expired had been answered inconsistently by the courts.202 In general,
four different standards for determining when the nonstatutory exemption
expired were applied by various courts, as follows: (1) immediately upon a
bargaining impasse;20 3 (2) upon the expiration of a given collective bargaining
agreement;204 (3) beyond impasse "'for as long as the employer continues to
impose a restriction under the reasonable belief that the restriction or a very
similar restriction will be incorporated into the next collective bargaining
agreement"; 20 5 and (4) the point at which the parties are "after impasse,"
provided that an "ongoing collective bargaining relationship" exists. 20 6
The Second Circuit in Williams and the Supreme Court in Brown clarified
any inconsistent interpretations of when the collective bargaining process exists
through their decisions.207 In Williams, the court held that "antitrust laws do not
prohibit employers from bargaining jointly with a union, from implementing
their joint proposals in the absence of a collective bargaining agreement, or from
using economic force to obtain agreement to those proposals."20 8 In Brown, the
Supreme Court affirmed the Eighth Circuit's repudiation of the "upon expiration
of a given collective bargaining agreement" test used by the district court. The
Court held that, upon impasse during the negotiation process, the nonstatutory
exemption would continue to waive antitrust liability insofar as a collective
bargaining agreement existed. 209
202 See Picher, supra note 99, at 34.
203 See id. at 31 (discussing the standard that was established by the United States
District Court for the District of Minnesota in Powell v. National Football League, Inc., 711
F. Supp. 959, 964 (D. Minn. 1989), rev'd, 930 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1989)).
204 See id. at 31-32 (discussing the standard established by the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia in Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 782 F. Supp. 125, 131-32
(D.D.C. 1991), rev'd, 50 F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1995), affd, 518 U.S. 231 (1996)).
205 ld at 32 (quoting the standard established by the United States District Court for the
District of New Jersey in Bridgeman v. National Basketball Ass'n, 675 F. Supp. 960, 967
(D.N.J. 1987)).
206 Id. (discussing the standard established by the Eight Circuit in Powell v. National
Football League, 930 F.2d 1293, 1302 (8th Cir. 1989)).
207 See id. at 34 (citing Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231 (1996); National
Basketball Ass'n v. Williams, 45 F.3d 684 (2d Cir. 1995)).
208 Williams, 45 F.3d at 693.
209 See Brown, 518 U.S. at 230-31. The factual scenario giving rise to the litigation in
Brown was that upon the expiration of the applicable collective bargaining agreement, the
League and the football players began negotiating a plan that would allow teams to have
"developmental squads" of reserve players. See id. at 234. The League wanted to pay the
players a $1000 weekly salary; the players, on the other hand, wanted the squad members
to be able to negotiate the terms of their contracts. See id. After an impasse in negotiations
had occurred, the League unilaterally implemented its proposal. See id. at 235.
When the players challenged the unilaterally implemented salary system for
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The holdings of these cases help clarify the time at which a player may bring
an antitrust action against the owners. A player would have to demonstrate the
following: (1) that the cause of action is outside the province of the current or
expired collective bargaining agreement (which would be difficult, as indicated
above); or (2) that the players and owners are not involved in the collective
bargaining process-that is, the union would have to be decertified. 210
2. Would the Players Choose to Decertify as a Means to Achieve
Their Objectives?
Some commentators believe that the likelihood of the MLBPA to decertify
is slight.211 However, given the MLBPA's push during the 1993-1994 collective
bargaining negotiations for Congress to create antitrust legislation, it appears that
the MLPBA would consider decertification as a viable action in the face of
owner action that would violate antitrust law.212 If the MLBPA is serious about
decertification, antitrust action is not an idle threat by the players against the
owners; thus, when a dispute arises between the owners and players during the
next collective bargaining agreement, which is almost a virtual certainty given
their history of acrimonious negotiations, the players will have an alternative
action against the owners.
3. Would Antitrust Action by the Players Be Successful?
Given the fact that the issue of a salary cap/revenue-sharing system has been
a major source of contention between the players and the owners for the last
three collective bargaining negotiations, such a system will in all probability be
the source of impasse during the next negotiations. An analysis of the salary
cap/revenue-sharing system under the "rule of reason" test may prove useful in
developmental players as violative of antitrust law, the Supreme Court held that the
"postimpasse imposition of a proposed employment term concerning a mandatory subject
of bargaining" was not a violation of antitrust law, insofar as the parties were subject to good
faith bargaining. Id. at 238-39. Further, the Court's opinion elucidated four actions that
employers could take after an impasse that potentially could violate antitrust law but were
exempt because of the nonstatutory exemption, as follows: (1) maintain the status quo; (2)
implement the last offer; (3) lock out their workers; or (4) negotiate separate interim
agreements with the union. See id. at 245.
210 See Picher, supra note 99, at 37.
211 See, e.g., Sica, supra note 68, at 295.
212 See Joshua Hamilton, Comment, Congress in Relief: The Economic Importance of
Revoking Baseball's Antitrust Exemption, 38 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1223, 1251 (1998);
Mark Maske, Both Sides File Charges with NLRB; Baseball Players, Owners Say Good
Faith Lacking, WASH. POST, Dec. 28, 1994, at C1.
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that it will predict the success of an antitrust action by the players against the
owners upon the implementation of such a system and thus will gauge the
efficacy of an antitrust suit as a bargaining tool for the players.
An analysis of the salary cap/revenue-sharing system under the "rule of
reason" test, established by the Supreme Court in Standard Oil Co. v. United
States,213 will demonstrate whether such a system is violative of antitrust law.
The rule of reason test is utilized by courts to determine whether the actions of
enterprises within a particular industry serve as a restraint of trade; the test states
that any restraint of trade by a party must be done with a legitimate purpose and
that the restraint imposed must be one that merely regulates or perhaps fosters
competition. 214
In McNeil v. National Football League, the rule of reason test was applied
to the player-restraint context in professional sports.215 First, the players have the
burden of proving that a provision implemented by the owners will have a
substantial effect upon the relevant market (in baseball, the competition for
players' services)216 and that the detrimental anticompetitive effects of this
practice outweigh any beneficial effects.217 Once the players have fulfilled their
burden of proof, the owners have the burden of proof of demonstrating that the
restraint has a legitimate business purpose218 -in other words, that the salary cap
maintains a competitive balance in the league. The league also must demonstrate
that the restraint is "no more restrictive than reasonably necessary." 219
Applied to the salary cap/revenue-sharing system, an antitrust action may not
be brought against the owners unless the players are able to fulfill the threshold
burden of demonstrating that the salary cap is a form of restraint on trade. The
players would be successful in fulfilling this burden because a salary cap system
is designed to limit the movement of players from team to team for higher
compensation. The cap would prevent teams who have reached the salary ceiling
of the cap from signing the most talented players, which in turn would cause a
drag in player salaries.
The next issue to be resolved under the rule of reason test is whether the
owners have a legitimate purpose for restraining player movement. 220 The
owners should not have a problem fulfilling this part of the rule of reason test
213 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
2 14 See id. at 38.
215 See McNeil v. National Football League, Civ. No. 4-90-476, 1992 WL 315292, at
*1-*7 (D. Minn. Sept. 10, 1992).
216 See id. at *3.
2 17 See id.
2 18 See id. at *4.
219 Id. at *5.
220 See Picher, supra note 99, at 52-53.
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because a salary cap would restore the competitive balance among the teams and
would preserve the financial stability of the individual teams, particularly the
small-market teams. The owners have a plausible argument that because a salary
cap system would preclude large-market teams from stockpiling talent by
offering contracts that small-market teams cannot match, the salary cap system
represents a legitimate restraint. Thus, the salary cap system would result in the
rebalancing of competitiveness among the teams and the fostering of fan interest
in the league.
The final issue under the rule of reason test is whether there is a less-
restrictive viable alternative as applied to the salary cap.221 Unfortunately for the
owners, the salary cap/revenue-sharing system violates this prong of the rule of
reason test because an alternative, less drastic measure to the salary cap exists.
For example, the salary taxation system of the current collective bargaining
agreement represents a less restrictive alternative system to a salary cap/revenue-
sharing system.222 The salary taxation system, like a salary cap/revenue-sharing
system, causes a drag in player salaries due to the fact that teams with the highest
payrolls are taxed for spending money for high-priced talent. However, unlike
the salary cap/revenue-sharing system, there is no "absolute barrier" with the
salary taxation system that prevents owners from signing free agents.223
Although both systems represent a restraint on labor competition and both
systems result in an even distribution of talent across teams, the salary taxation
system is less burdensome to player movement by virtue of the fact that there is
no cap to prevent owners from signing free agents. Furthermore, there are
systems other than the salary taxation system which essentially accomplish the
goals of the salary cap/revenue-sharing system without being so restrictive to
player movement. 224 Thus, it appears that a salary cap/revenue-sharing system
will not pass this second prong of the rule of reason test.
Since a salary cap/revenue-sharing system in all probability would violate
antitrust law, the owners should give second thoughts to coercing the players into
such a system. If the players were to agree to such a system in the next collective
bargaining agreement and the salary cap/revenue-sharing system were to cause
a stronger drag on their salaries, the players could bring an antitrust suit against
the owners that probably would succeed.
221 See id. at 60.
222 See id.
223 Id.
224 Some alternative methods to a salary cap/revenue-sharing system include sharing
revenue between owners without salary restraints, abolishing salary arbitration, creating an
unprotected player pool, and making offers to minor league players as free agent
compensation. See id. at 61.
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4. How Will the Threat of Antitrust Action Effect the Player-Owner
Relations During the Collective Bargaining Process?
As stated above, the predominant characteristic of the current negotiation
process in baseball has been one of positional bargaining between the owners
and players. This positional bargaining process has fostered animosity between
the owners and the players, and it has prompted them, particularly the owners,
to use bad faith bargaining tactics in attempts to realize their interests.
What effects will the lifting of the antitrust exemption and the possibility of
owner liability under the Sherman Act have upon the state of negotiations in
baseball? If the players convince the owners that an antitrust action is a
legitimate part of their bargaining arsenal, the players potentially could force the
owners to refrain from taking actions that could be considered "bad faith
bargaining." Before the enactment of the Curt Flood Act of 1998, if the owners
acted in bad faith, the players either had to "put up with it or go on strike,"225
both undesirable maneuvers for the players. With the lifting of the antitrust
exemption by the Curt Flood Act, the players could force the owners into
litigation by bringing an antitrust suit under the Sherman Act. Given the high
costs of litigation, the owners in all probability would opt for good faith
bargaining over the probability of a costly trial battle and the negative publicity
that would accompany it.226 A further beneficial result of the threat of litigation
and the resulting good faith bargaining by the owners would be a de-emphasis
on the Act, thereby striking the balance in favor of the players, that is, as a
bargaining tactic.227
Thus, the lifting of the antitrust exemption from baseball will have a direct
effect upon the negotiation process used by the owners and the players. The
possibility of an antitrust action would prompt the owners to act in good faith,
thus alleviating some of the hostility that often is felt by both sides as a result of
bad faith bargaining.
VII. CONCLUSION
The history of collective bargaining in baseball has been a lesson in difficult
battles. While the players and the owners have negotiated labor issues through
collective bargaining, the process has proveri to be costly, both financially and
to its reputation as an American pastime. Collective bargaining in baseball will
continue to be acrimonious until the players and owners switch from a positional
bargaining methodology to a principled one. Fortunately for baseball, the lifting
225 Chaplin, supra note 157, at 232.
226 See id.
227 See id.
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of baseball's antitrust exemption likely will have a positive impact upon
baseball's current collective bargaining status by inducing the owners to act in
good faith bargaining, which has not always been their bargaining posture, and
by offering the players an alternative action other than striking and postponing
a season, an action that altogether has been too detrimental to the image of the
game.
